What is the difference between perception and conception

Conception generally attracts lot of engagement and co-operation wide-spread and sometimes also involves group discussions as act of community. Conception is always related to an action that is done with the mind and involves deep imagination and thought process. Like for an example, it's hard to conceive, what he might be going through. A person's perception processing is connected with the person's conception about that particular thing, expectation and knowledge which also influences the perception.

This means that conception has the power to influence the perception of a particular thing for a particular person depending on the mental ability and knowledge. Both the words conceive and perceive are related to ideas and concepts. The conception influences perception through experience or expectation and equally our perception of something equally can change with experience or knowledge and is likely to influence our future conception about that particular thing or object.

Both the terms promotes each other. Conscious understanding of something, Vision, organization,identification and interpretation of sensory information.

The act of conceiving, the state of being conceived, the formation of an idea, image or a notion. Difference Between Perception and Conception. Perception: How a person perceives a specific event or thing depends upon mental ability and experience and is different from other person's experience.

Types of perception: Visual Perception- Sense of sight or vision eyes. Sound- Sense of hearing ear. Touch, which is also called as Haptic Perception skin. Taste or also called as Gustation tongue. If the situation supports sufficient reliability, an organism can come to use it as genuine information.

If something is sufficiently reliable, then you can spend time getting better at detecting it perceptual learning and coming to understand what it means by using it to control action.

We typically talk about learning to detect time-to-contact information and learning that it means this by using it to control interceptive actions. You could easily, with the same mechanism, talk about learning to detect the information for the lever and coming to learn that it means food, by using that information to get food, rather than merely to press the lever. So I say 'if something is sufficiently reliable'.

I maintain that this is a big if, out in the world; possibly too big for anything other than specification to ultimately work. In the lab, of course, it's less of a problem. So the rat can come to learn that the information about the lever means food, because it does; the higher order event structure is actually there to support this, in the same way time-to-contact means what it does.

Sabrina, I wish I had better terms to suggest. The problem is worse than the boundary being fuzzy. I am also very sensitive to the 'getting past editors' issue.

In a recent past-life, I was a non-representational developmental psychologist. Yes, ecological psychologists must 'branch out' and it is difficult.

It is problematic that, after all this time, there are not more ecological psychologists on the editorial boards of major journals, at grant funding agencies, etc. In part I blame the overly adversarial attitude that perhaps necessarily characterized the early development of the field.

I'm skipping the second point, I know, but the quest for a coherent behaviorism is a much longer discussion. Certainly, though, a good behaviorist should be as averse to metaphorical representation-talk as any ecological psychologist. My comments were purely about the framing. Perception-independent experience. There are still proper behaviourists out there - I work in the area of contemporary learning theories, not behaviourism - this is important to some people ; now to a couple of the points raised above: 2 I'm not sure about the 'association' vs.

As I understand it, Eco-Psych doesn't go beyond a simple SR approach to explain conditioning though, and there are several well established learning phenomena that don't fit that. Pair a tone and a light. Then pair light and food. The animal will respond to the tone, as if it had been paired with food.

They also are able to flexibly alter their behaviour, when they need to - and its this that I struggle to see how eco-psych explains. By what process does this happen? It sounds a little like magic to me? One of the things I like about your approach is the parsimony - but when it becomes overly descriptive I struggle, because I can't see how this is a more parsimonious approach than one that invokes representations.

Sorry this isn't quite as coherent as it might be Eric said: One of the big lessons from 'pragmatism' is that there is no clear line between different cognitive phenomena Which motivates my general posture - attempting to reduce behavior to pure responsive action, possibly along the lines of Rorty's reduction of phil of language to "pure Davidsonian semantics" not to suggest that I am totally clear on what he means by that.

Here, that leads to an attempt to reduce, if not eliminate, the role of the "food" concept. Note that I stop my description of the rat's behavior at "ingestible", by which I mean only "swallowable". I see the rat as having learned to respond to the tone by executing a composite action that often leads to that affordance.

If an object offering that affordance is thereby reached, whether it is "edible" seems a separable issues. In fact, I don't even consider that an affordance. It's approaching noon, so I head for the kitchen - not because I'm salivating but because my watch is offering read-time-from-able. I'm just executing a "stored" procedure that may or may not result in access to any food.

My wife does the shopping, so I often have no idea which it will be. And she might find the analogy apt in other respects!

On to networks. Although "reverberation" seems to be on the right track, a better term might be "resonance". One can envision Sabrina's perceptual network as constituting an adaptive filter bank. The learning process would be to "grow" the filter bank so that a new member would pass a specific perceived input signal ie, the neural activity consequent to sensory input. Then in a sense to be described, part of the filter bank would become "resonant with" that signal.

The output from a specific filter would excite a part of the network that would activate motor neurons that in turn initiate an appropriate responsive action. There are several features of Sabrina's network view that make it a much better way of thinking about what I had in mind by "progressive pattern matching". It is inherently continuous; it provides a natural connection between sensory input and motor output; which in turn creates the feedback loop needed for adaptive behavior, eg, smooth tracking; and finally, it eliminates the need for precise "pattern matching".

A so-called "matched filter" can be thought of as doing a correlation between the received signal and a stored version of a signal to be detected. But such a filter will respond - "resonate" - to any input signal that isn't "too far removed" from the signal to which it is matched.

The response will be attenuated relative to the response of the matched signal, but can still activate a response that is "good enough". This view also arguably works with dreams. A matched filter can resonate in response to signals that have no meaningful relationship to the signal to which it is matched. Thus, dreams could result from outputs of the filter bank due to arbitrary inputs AKA, "noise" spontaneously generated in the sensory input path.

Usually, the responses would not be actualized as motion, although some can be - talking in one's sleep and, in extreme cases, sleepwalking. I agree that "stored response" is a poor way of describing the process and didn't mean to suggest that the system has no adaptive aspect. In any event, since Sabrina's filter view arguably responds even to inputs that "aren't quite right" and incorporates feedback, that issue more-or-less goes away.

Pam, As I read Gibson, he is agnostic about most of the core issues of behaviorism. He had opinions to be sure, as he was mentored by one of the greatest of the early behaviorists or at least Holt was so known in his day , and his system assumed a great deal of what behaviorist have always arguing for, but he chose not to make that his fight. Gibson wanted to know how we perceived things, and thought perception was intimately related to action, but he offered no theory about why animals sometimes act one way and other times act differently.

On the other hand, learning theory is primarily about why organisms act one way sometimes and other ways other times. Though I don't know quite how to pull off the magic, I am convinced that the approaches are complementary, rather than adversarial. You are right though, that some of the most influential ecological psychologists e. Though they would never admit that this is what they have offered, they have, and you are also correct that it is problematic.

As a side note to this from Charles, one of my favourite things that I know about dreaming is that the motor system from the neck down is very actively inhibited during dreaming, and failures of this inhibition are often disastrous because the behaviour isn't connected to the world I don't think sleepwalking occurs during REM.

Evolution clearly noticed it was important to utterly lock down a system, and it always makes me realise how important good access to information is. The other cool thing I know about sleep is that dolphins sleep one hemisphere at a time, so they can continue to move in the water safely under active control.

I draw similar conclusions there too :. Pam - Sorry, but I'm not familiar with the relevant lingo. Could you elaborate "Pair a tone and a light"? I assume "pair a light and food" means training the subject to take an action when a light event occurs, an action that will result in access to food. But it's not obvious to me how to adapt that description to "pair a tone and light".

I'm back to being confused about how purposes or goals enter the picture, so I have no answer. Maybe it is by magic! Charles, To "pair a light and food" means to present them at the same time typically one presents the light immediately before the food.

Pam is pointing out that her original claim was about "classical condition" Pavlovian drooling-dog stuff rather than "operant conditioning" Skinnerian rat-pressing-lever stuff. To be more specific, if you are "pairing" then the behavior of the organism does NOT cause the outcome.

As for purposes or goals, this is a problematic discussion. A rat that works to press a lever is a rat that want's to press a lever. I don't know about Rorty, but Peirce would agree. The behaviorists built a science about how a rat that does not want to do certain thing becomes a rat that does want to do certain things. Alas, with a few notable exceptions, they eschewed the words 'want' or 'purpose'. Note, I once again cheated by switching to an operant situation.

This has lead to all sorts of confusion, for example, you will not find learning theory mentioned in an introductory psychology textbook's chapter on motivation. So put rat in skinner box. Eric and Pam - Thanks for the explanation. I of course have a top level idea about how conditioning works, but no idea at all what the detailed procedures are like. Those responses help a lot. So, what about the following. Suppose Sabrina's perceptual network is more or less accurately modeled by a filter bank.

Then one can hypothesize that the learning process that pairs tone and light causes the simultaneous "growth" in the network of light and tone "matched filters" that are effectively in parallel but which have no output, ie, no connections to motor neurons, Then in the learning process that pairs tone and food, the resulting output connections might be shared by default by the two filters so that their sensory neuronal inputs are effectively logically "OR"ed with respect to producing a common motor neuronal output.

That seems to produce the observed behavior as I understand it. If I'm right in guessing that a relevant behavior included in "specific satiety effects" is the subject's not responding to the tone when not hungry, that seems straightforward as well at least in the simplistic model. Being hungry is the kind of input included when you "expand[] the 'perceptual' network to include all stimuli whether from perceptions or from internal sources such as emotions and memories".

Hunger would simply be an input to the network that could in principle be used to gate the parallel tone and light matched filters - or their inputs - on and off. Hi Charles - not sure what you mean by a filter bank - but what you are describing sounds a little to me like an associative model! There are two types of satiety effect - one is the reduction in response when not hungry, and one is the reduction in response when sated on a specific reward.

So if a tone predicts sucrose solution, and a light predicts a savory food pellet, when the rat has had access to the sucrose solution for an hour before a test session which is conducted with no rewards present , it will continue to respond during the light, but will no longer respond during the tone. That seems to require something more sophisticated than a hunger 'gate'.

It involves encoding the current value of the reward is it still rewarding? A similar experiment can look at learning about flavours. Animals are given a drinking tube of salty vanilla water, say 10 mls a day, for 4 days. They are also given a tube at a different time of day of 10ml of almond flavoured water. They will then choose to drink vanilla no salt present water more than almond water.

I agree that our approaches can be complimentary - and I'm tremendously enjoying trying to get my head around your approach. Incidentally, I came across a lovely example similar to the steam governor - my son has built a maplin electronics kit to make a 'bug' that follows light.

So when the light shines, that turns on the motor on that side, making the bug move towards the light. No "representation" required, but if you stuck in an electrode, you might interpret the electric signal as a representation. Food for thought re. Pam, those robot kits were probably inspired by some robotics work by Pfifer and Scheier link to their book done explicitly to show you could get complex behaviour emerging from simple systems embodied in particular ways.

You should try adjusting the spacing between the sensors, you'll get interesting changes in behaviour with no change to the 'neural' control system! In the absence of light, it just idles. When a light source appears, the wheels are enabled and the device tracks the light source. Image Courtesy: Pixabay. Hasa is a BA graduate in the field of Humanities and is currently pursuing a Master's degree in the field of English language and literature.

Her areas of interests include language, literature, linguistics and culture. Very well explained, e. Your email address will not be published. She directed the project from conception to production. Comments Very well explained, e.

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